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RECOUPMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974)
In Fuller v. Oregon1 the Supreme Court
held that a state may constitutionally require a
person convicted of a criminal offense to repay
to the state the costs of providing him effective
legal representation when he is indigent at the
time of the criminal proceedings against him
but later acquires the means to bear the costs
of his legal defense.
Fuller, an indigent defendant, was repre-
sented by court-appointed counsel in criminal
proceedings charging him with sodomy in the
third degree. After pleading guilty, Fuller re-
ceived a five-year probationary sentence condi-
tioned upon complying with a work-release
program at the county jail which would allow
him to attend college, and also upon reimburs-
ing the county for the fees of his attorney and
a private investigator hired by the attorney to
aid in gathering facts for the case. Under the
Oregon recoupment scheme a defendant would
not be denied counsel if he were indigent at
the time of criminal proceedings, but he could
be required to repay to the state the costs of
furnishing him with effective representation of
counsel if and when he acquired the means to
do so. The Oregon statutes authorize, but do
not mandate, recoupment of defense costs and
the imposition of an obligation to repay such
costs as a condition of probation; however,
they impose such an obligation only upon those
who actually become able to meet it without
hardship. Contending that his probation could
not constitutionally be conditioned on the re-
payment of legal expenses, Fuller appealed his
sentence to the Oregon Court of Appeals
which affirmed its imposition.2 The Supreme
Court of Oregon subsequently denied a petition
for review.3 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari4 because of the im-
portance of the question presented and the con-
1 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
2 State v. Fuller, 12 Ore. App. 152, 504 P2d
1393 (1973).
aIn its decision, the Supreme Court noted that
the Oregon Supreme Court had denied a petition
for review of the appellate court's decision. 417
U.S. at 42.
4 Fuller v. Oregon, - U.S. - (1973).
flict of opinion on the constitutional issue
involved.5
In the right to counsel cases such as Gideon
v. Wainwright" and beginning with a line of
"new equal protection cases" 7 such as Griffin
v. Illinois," the Court had imposed on the
states a range of obligations to remove finan-
cial barriers to indigents struggling in the
criminal process; yet it had remained hesitant
to determine whether the state had a right to
seek reimbursement for expenditures incurred
in fulfilling those obligations. In Rinaldi v.
3reager9 the Court considered a New Jersey
statute which required only those prisoners
confined to state institutions to pay for the
costs of transcripts of trial court proceedings
needed on appeal. The Court held that the stat-
ute violated the equal protection clause because
it individiously discriminated between con-
victed persons confined to prison and those
given a suspended sentence, probation, or a
fine without imprisonment. The Court assumed
that a state could validly provide for recoup-
ment of the cost of appeals from those who be-
came able to pay, if such a provision were ap-
plied with an even hand.10 It was permissible
to replenish the county treasury from those
who benefited from its expenditures, but it was
an invidious discrimination to fasten this finan-
5 The Cdurt points out that courts in some
other states reviewing similar recoupment schemes
have reached different conclusions than the Oregon
Court of Appeals in the present case. 417 U.S. at
42, n.3. In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455 P.2d 143
78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969) ; Opinion of the Justices,
109 N.H. 508, 256 A.2d 500 (1969); State ex rel.
Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash. 2d 676, 521 P.2d 706
(1974). Cf., James v. Strange, 323 F. Supp. 1230
(D. Kan. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 407 US
123 (1972).
6 372 U.S. 335 (1962). See also Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
7 For a discussion of the development of a new
equal protection doctrine in the Burger Court, see
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
8 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
a 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
:0 Id. at 311.
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cial burden only upon those unsuccessful appel-
lants confined to state institutions because such
selection bore no rational relationship to the
fiscal objective of the statute."3 The Court did
not determine whether the New Jersey statute
unduly burdened an indigent's right to
appeal.12 Then in James v. Strange,2 a unani-
mous Court noted that state statutes seeking to
recoup costs expended by the state to provide
indigent criminal defendants with legal repre-
sentation were not necessarily unconstitutional
and might serve legitimate state interests. It
nonetheless held a Kansas recoupment statute
unconstitutional as a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause since it denied to indigent de-
fendants all of the exemptions provided other
judgment debtors and thus singled out a class
of judgment debtors for discriminatory treat-
ment for no rational reason. The Court again
refused to base its decision on whether the
Kansas statute involved had an unconstitu-
tional "chilling effect," but looked instead to
the violation of equal protection. 14 Because
state recoupment laws differed widely in their
content, the Court maintained that it was inap-
propriate to make "any broadside pronounce-
ment on their validity."' 5 Although recoup-
ment statutes may represent legitimate state
interests, the Court asserted that such interests
would not be furthered by a statute, such as
the Kansas statute, that embodied "elements of
punitiveness and discrimination which violate
the rights of citizens to equal treatment under
the law." '
Fidler v. Oregon lays to rest the question
of whether a state can require an indigent
person convicted of a criminal offense to re-
pay to the state the costs of providing him
legal representation if he acquires the means to
bear such costs.17 In an opinion by Mr. Justice
11 Id. at 309-10.
2 Id. at 307-08.
'3 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
14 Id. at 134.
15 Id. at 133.
bId. at 141-42.
x7 The controversy over recoupment plans can
be followed in the following: ABA, PROJECT ON
PROVIDING DEFENSE SmvicEs, 58-59 (Approved
Draft 1968); D. OAxEs, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ACT IN THE FEDERAL DIsRIcT COURTs, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
58-59 (Comm. Print 1969) ; Kamisar and Choper,
The Rights to Counsel in Minnesota-Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN.
Stewart a majority of six justices affirmed the
state court's holding. Examining the plan and
operation of the Oregon scheme, the Court
found little difference between it and the ap-
pointment of counsel procedures in states with-
out recoupment provisions. Oregon law re-
quires that every defendant in a criminal case
must be assigned counsel at state expense if
it "appears to the court that the defendant
is without means and unable to obtain
counsel."'18 In some cases all or part of the
"expenses specially incurred by the state in
prosecuting the defendant" are to be repaid to
the state; when a convicted person is placed on
probation, repayment may be made a condition
of that probation.'9 Although the costs of a
L. REv. 1, 23-27 (1963); Comment, Reimburse-
ment of Defense Costs as a Condition of Proba-
tion for Indigents, 67 Mica. L. REV. 1404 (1969) ;
Comment, Conditions of Probation Imposed on
Wisconsin Felons: Costs of Prosecution and Res-
titution, 1962 WIs. L. REv. 672 (1962); Note, Re-
quirement that a Convicted Indigent Reimburse
County for Assigned Counsel as a Condition of
Probation Held to Violate Sixth Amendment, 38
FoRD tAm L. REv. 333 (1969); Note, Charging
Costs of Prosecution to the Defendant, 59 Go.
L.J. 991 (1971).
IS ORE. Ray STAT. § 135.050(1)(d) (1971).
Om. REV. STAT. § 135.050(3)(a) mandates that
counsel be appointed for an indigent defendant
"[c]harged with a crime."
19 The Oregon recoupment statutes are as fol-
lows: ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.655 provides:
(1) The court may require a convicted de-
fendant to pay costs.
(2) Costs shall be limited to expenses spe-
cially incurred by the state in prosecuting the
defendant. They cannot include expenses in-
herent in providing a constitutionally guaran-
teed jury trial or expenditures in connection
with the maintenance and operation of govern-
ment agencies that must be made by the pub-
lic irrespective of specific violations of law.
(3) The court shall not sentence a defend-
ant to pay costs unless the defendant is or
will be able to pay them. In determining the
amount and method of payment of costs, the
court shall take account of the financial re-
sources of the defendant and the nature of the
burden that payment of costs will impose.
(4) A defendant who has been sentenced to
pay costs and who is not in contumacious de-
fault in the payment thereof may at any time
petition the court which sentenced him for re-
mission of the payment of costs or of any un-
paid portion thereof. If it appears to the satis-
faction of the court that payment of the
amount due will impose manifest hardship on
the defendant or his immediate family, the
court may remit all or part of the amount due
in costs or modify the method of payment
under Ore. Rev. Stat. § 161.675.
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convicted person's legal defense are included in
these expenses, 20 repayment is not necessarily
mandatory. Several conditions must first be
Om. REv. STAT. § 161.675 provides:
(1) When a defendant is sentenced to pay a
fine or costs, the court may grant permission
for payment to be made within a specified pe-
riod of time or in specified instalments. If no
such permission is included in the sentence the
fine shall be payable forthwith.
(2) When a defendant sentenced to pay a
fine or costs is also placed on probation or
imposition or execution of sentence is sus-
pended, the court may make payment of the
fine or costs a condition of probation or sus-
pension of sentence.
ORE. REv. STAT. § 161.685 provides:
(1) When a defendant sentenced to pay a
fine defaults in the payment thereof or of any
instalment, the court on motion of the district
attorney or upon its own motion may require
him to show cause why his default should not
be treated as contempt of court, and may issue
a show cause citation or a warrant of arrest
for his appearance.
(2) Unless the defendant shows that his de-
fault was not attributable to an intentional re-
fusal to obey the order of the court or to a
failure on his part to make a good faith effort
to make the payment, the court may find that
his default constitutes contempt and may order
him committed until the fine, or a specified
part thereof, is paid.
(3) When a fine is imposed on a corpora-
tion or association to pay the fine from those
assets, and his failure to do so may be held to
be contempt unless he makes the showing re-
quired in subsection (2) of this section.
(4) The term of imprisonment for contempt
for nonpayment of fines shall be set forth in
the commitment order and shall not exceed
one day for each $25 of the fine, 30 days if
the fine was imposed upon conviction of a vio-
lation or misdemeanor, or one year in any
other case, whichever is the shorter period. A
person committed for nonpayment of a fine
shall be given credit toward payment for each
day of imprisonment at the rate specified in
the commitment order.
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the
court that the default in the payment of a fine
is not contempt, the court may enter an order
allowing the defendant additional time for
payment, reducing the amount thereof or of
each instalment or revoking the fine or the
unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part.
(6) A default in the payment of a fine or
cost or any instalment thereof may be col-
lected by any means authorized by law for the
enforcement of a judgment. The levy of exe-
cution for the collection of a fine shall not
discharge a defendant committed to imprison-
ment for contempt until the amount of the fine
has actually been collected.
20 Fuller argued that the section of the Oregon
recoupment statute authorizing an obligation to
met: (1) repayment may be imposed only
upon convicted defendants;21 (2) the court
cannot order a convicted person to pay expen-
ses unless he "is or will be able to pay them;" 22
(3) a convicted person under an obligation
to repay expenses may petition the sentencing
court at any time for "remission of the pay-
ment of costs or of any portion thereof" if
such payment would result in hardship 23 and
(4) no convicted person may be held in con-
tempt for failure to repay if he demonstrates
that such failure "was not attributable to an
intentional refusal to obey the order of the
court or to a failure on his part to make a
good faith effort to make payment." 24 Thus,
the Oregon scheme does provide a lawyer at
the expense of the state to all defendants fac-
ing criminal charges who are unable, even
temporarily, to hire one. The obligation to
repay affects only those who later acquire the
means to do so without hardship.
Having examined the statute, the majority
rejected petitioner's first contention, based on
James v. Strange,25 that Oregon's recoupment
system violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment because of various
discriminatory classifications explicitly or im-
plicitly drawn by legislative provisions. The
Court distinguished James v. Strange on the
grounds that the Oregon recoupment scheme
did not suffer from the same infirmity as the
Kansas statute in James which denied to an
indigent defendant the exemptions available to
other judgment debtors.26 Under Oregon law,
a convicted person from whom reimbursement
is sought retains all the safeguards accorded
other judgment debtors, plus an opportunity to
demonstrate "manifest hardship" at any time.27
Accordingly, the majority found the Oregon
legislation to be "wholly free of the kind of
repay "expenses specially incurred by the state in
prosecuting the defendant," ORE. Rxv. STAT. §
161.665(2), was not intended to include counsel
fees. The state court resolved this issue of state
law against the petitioner, 12 Ore. App. at 157, 504
P.2d at 1396. The Supreme Court did not examine
on the basis of Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
21 OE. REV. STAT. § 161.665(1) (1971).
22 O REv. STAT. § 161.665(3) (1971).
23 ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.665(4) (1971).
24 Omn. REv. STAT. § 161.685 (1971).
25 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
26KAN. STAT. ANN. § 224513 (Supp. 1973).
27 ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.665(4) (1971).
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discrimination that was held in James v.
Strange to violate the Equal Protection
Clause." 28
Nor did the Oregon statute deny equal pro-
tection by discriminating between defendants
who are convicted and those who are not con-
victed or whose convictions are ultimately re-
versed. The Court asserted that there need
only be "some rationality in the nature of the
class singled out" 29 and held the distinction
forwarded by petitioner noninvidious:
Oregon could surely decide with objective ra-
tionality that when a defendant has been forced
to submit to a criminal prosecution that does
not end in conviction, he will be freed of any
potential liability to reimburse the State for the
costs of his defense. This legislative decision
reflects no more than an attempt to achieve
elemental fairness and is a far cry from the
kind of invidious discrimination that the Equal
Protection Clause condemns. 0
The majority also rejected the equal protection
argument that the requirement to repay de-
fense expenses was imposed only on convicted
defendants placed on probation, and not those
sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Although
such a distinction might be justified on the
grounds that a person placed on probation
would be more likely to earn funds needed to
repay the state, the Court discarded the con-
tention because the statute itself made no such
distinction nor did the record demonstrate that
Oregon engaged in such a practice.
3
'
The majority went on to examine petition-
er's second basic contention 32 that Oregon's re-
28 417 U.S. at 48.
29 417 U.S. at 49 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966)).
30 417 U.S. at 50.
31 Id. at 49, n.10.
32 The Court refused to rule upon claims by
Fuller that imposition of the conditional obligation
to repay was made without sufficient notice or
hearing and was therefore in violation of due
process, because such contentions were not raised
in the state courts and were not discussed by the
Oregon Court of Appeals, thus leading to the as-
sumption that the omission was "due to want of
proper presentation in the state courts." Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 582 (1969). The Court
did note, however, that the recoupment scheme, in-
cluding a schedule of fees, was published in the
Oregon Revised Statutes at the time of petitioner's
plea and that "both Oregon's judgment execution
and her parole revocation procedures provide for a
hearing before execution can be levied or proba-
tion revoked. " 417 U.S. at 50 n.11.
coupment statute infringed upon his constitu-
tional right to appointed counsel if indigent,
because knowledge that he might have to repay
the expenses might also impel him to decline
appointed counsel. This might chill his consti-
tutional right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment.33 Since such knowledge by the defendant
did not affect his eligibility to obtain counsel,
and since the Oregon scheme did not deprive
him of necessary legal assistance, the Court
found that defendant's right to counsel was not
infringed.3 4  In rejecting petitioner's sixth
amendment contention, the majority empha-
sized that the present case was "fundamentally
different" from decisions relied upon by Fuller
which invalidated laws placing a penalty on
the exercise of a constitutional right.35 Those
cases dealt with provisions that "had no other
purpose than to chill the assertion of constitu-
tional rights by penalizing those who choose to
exercise them," 3 while, on the other hand,
Oregon's recoupment statute does not penalize
the indigent defendant who accepts court-
appointed counsel, but merely imposes an obli-
gation to reimburse the state for its expenses
on those with a foreseeable ability to meet such
an obligation and enforces such obligation only
against those who could meet it without
hardship.37
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred with the re-
sult of the majority's decision but not with its
reasoning. In a separate opinion he relied upon
the narrow construction given the recoupment
scheme by the Oregon Court of Appeals38 to
dispose of petitioner's claim that the statute
33 This right to counsel is secured in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The California su-
preme court expressed the view that a defendant's
knowledge that he may remain under an obligation
to repay expenses might create a chilling effect in
In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 207 (1969), holding a California recoupment
statute invalid. The Court here concluded that the
California court's reasoning was "wide of the con-
stitutional mark." 417 U.S. at 52.
34417 U.S. at 53.
z5 See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
36 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581
(1968).
37 417 U.S. at 54.
38 State v. Fuller, 12 Ore. App. 152, 504, P.2d
1393 (1973).
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"chilled" the exercise of his right to counsel.3 9
Mr. Justice Douglas asserted that under the
state court's construction of the statute, repay-
ment cannot be required until a defendant is
able to pay the costs of his defense and proba-
tion cannot be revoked for nonpayment unless
there is a specific finding by the sentencing
court that payment would not cause hardship
on the defendant or his family; thus, any
"chill" that existed would be no greater than
that imposed on a nonindigent defendant who
is just above the indigency cut-off point. Such
a nonindigent defendant may be ready to ac-
cept free counsel but receives no such choice
since the Constitution does not require a state
to provide counsel for such persons.40 The con-
curring opinion also found no denial of equal
protection in the assessment of costs against
only those defendants who stand convicted.
Mr. Justice Douglas maintained that it was ra-
tional for a state to recover costs from a de-
fendant who has been found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt while not assessing such costs
to defendants against whom the state had not
proven its charges. 41
Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice
Brennan, dissented from the majority's opinion
on the grounds that the Oregon recoupment
statute, insofar as it permits payment of an in-
digent defendant's debt to be made a condition
of his probation, violated equal protection re-
quirements by providing unequal treatment be-
tween indigent defendants and other civil
judgment debtors. Petitioner's failure to pay
his debt could result in imprisonment, and in
that respect, the indigent defendant, like the
indigent defendant in James v. Strange, is
treated quite differently from other civil judg-
ment debtors.4 2 Ar. Justice Marshall pointed to
article I, § 19 of the Oregon constitution,
which provides that "there shall be no impris-
onment for debt, except in the case of fraud or
absconding debtors." Accordingly, if a nonindi-
gent defendant in a criminal case fails to pay
39 417 U.S. at 56 (Douglas, J., concurring).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 57.
42 The dissent recognized that Oregon's recoup-
ment scheme did not fail to provide the same pro-
tective exemptions afforded other civil judgment
debtors, the focus of the Court's analysis in James
v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). 417 U.S. at 60
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
his privately retained attorney, he cannot be
imprisoned for that failure; the lawyer must
enforce his judgment through the normal
routes available to the creditor. Yet, petitioner,
an indigent defendant, could be imprisoned for
five years if he failed to pay for his court-ap-
pointed counsel. Thus, since Oregon does not
provide imprisonment for nonindigent defend-
ants who fail to pay their retained counsel, the
dissent asserted it cannot imprison an indigent
defendant for his failure to pay the costs of ap-
pointed counsel without creating an invidious
discrimination on the basis of wealth in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause.43
The dissent seems to present a powerful ar-
gument, especially in light of article I, § 19 of
the Oregon constitution. However, both the
majority and the concurring opinions rejected
this reasoning on the grounds that its conten-
tion, raised by amicus curiae,44 was not prop-
erly before the Supreme Court. The majority
observed that such a contention had not been
made in petitioner's brief or oral argument,
nor had it been raised in the state courts; the
Supreme Court did not have the power to de-
cide state law questions involving the ap-
plicability of a provision of the Oregon
constitution.45 Mr. Justice Douglas, in his con-
curring opinion, also argued that this equal
protection point was not properly before the
Court since it was not raised in or considered
by the state courts. "The proper construction
of state law and the proper resolution of the
dependent equal protection claim would prop-
erly be raised by another litigant or by peti-
tioner by way of collateral attack." 46
43 417 U.S. at 61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44 The article I, § 19 problem was brought to
the attention of the Court in the amicus curiae
brief of the National Legal Aid and Defender As-
sociation. 417 U.S. at 58 n.5 (Douglas J., concur-
ring).
45 417 U.S. at 48, n.9.
46 417 U.S. at 59 (Douglas, J., concurring), Mr.
Justice Douglas stated that the Court will not pass
on questions substantively different from those
presented to the state courts, even when the fed-
eral claim is nominally based on the same federal
constitutional clause relied on before the state
courts, referring to Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474,
483-84 (1946). He also asserted that the equal
protection clause would only be violated if a par-
ticular construction of the state law were adopted
by the state courts. The Court could not assume




In Fuller v. Oregon the Court has at last
stated that recoupment statutes do not neces-
sarily burden an indigent's right to counsel,
nor do they necessarily constitute an invidious
discrimination in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause, at least if worded as carefully as
the Oregon scheme. Recoupment may be a
wealth-dependent burden on an indigent's ac-
cess to legal representation, but it is now held
to be a constitutionally permissible burden with
a rational relationship to the ends sought by
the state, especially when the indigent is not
forced to undergo hardship to meet the state's
demands. Although state statutes will have to
undergo individual examination because they
are so diverse,47 a recoupment scheme will not
infringe upon an indigent's right to counsel as
long as it does not affect his eligibility to ob-
tain counsel or deprive him of necessary legal
assistance. 48 The equal protection clause will
not be violated as long as indigent defendants
47 Some examples of recoupment schemes are:
ALA. CODE Tit. 15, § 318(12) (Supp. 1973);
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.020 (1972); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 27.56 (Supp. 1973-74); IDAHO CODE
§ 10-858 (Supp. 1973) ; IND. ArNr. STAT. § 9-3501
(Supp. 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 775.5 (Supp.
1974-75); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 26, § 12C
(1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-22-7 (1972);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1 (1974); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-283 (Supp. 1973); TEx. CODE CRIn.
PR0C., Art. 1018 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. §
14.1-184 (1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-1
(Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.66 (1971).
The federal reimbursement provision is 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(f) (1970).
48 417 U.S. at 52.
required to repay the state for their defense
costs receive the same exemptions afforded
other judgment debtors 49 and as long as the
system used is "rational." 50
Yet, despite this new delineation, the crux of
petitioner's appeal-the question as to whether
a person placed on probation conditioned on
repayment of his defense costs can constitu-
tionally be imprisoned if he fails to repay-still
remains unanswered. After asserting that the
dissent's equal protection contention was not
properly before the Court, the majority opinion
went on to point out that under the Oregon
statute, revocation is not a collection device
used to enforce debts but a sanction imposed
by the state courts. Since that sanction is only
imposed under certain conditions, there is no
violation of the equal protection clause.5 1 In
his concurring opinion, however, Mr. Justice
Douglas correctly observed that since the dis-
sent's contention was not properly before the
Court and was furthermore dependent upon a
particular construction of state law, this find-
ing by the majority was little more than an ad-
visory opinion rendered in a vacuum.5 2 Thus,
due to this deficiency in the record, the Court
has not solved the conditional probation issue
and may very well have to face the problem
again someday when confronted with a more
appropriate case.
49 Id. at 47.50 Id. at 50.
51 Id. at 48, n.9.
52 Id. at 59 (Douglas, J., concurring).
[Vol. 65
